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STUDENT Noms
In the Fehr case the gas tank valves were shown to be defective
and the gas tank was not furnished by the defendant. The keg was
shown to be sound and the beer had tasted all right the night before
the explosion, negativing any suspicion of its being abnormally fer-
menting. Therefore the plaintiff, in fact, had as much chance to know
the cause of the injury as did the defendant and the burden of proof
was justly left with the plaintiff.
Vn~cENT F. KE Y.
TAXATION-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DISCRIMINATION AS TO
RATE
The question of the constitutionality of a Kentucky statute, taxing
deposits in Kentucky banks at a rate of one-tenth of one percent
annually, as compared to five-tenths of one percent on bank deposits
which are located outside the State, arose in the case of Uommonweath
v. Madden's Exr.1 The appellee's contention is that the above statute
is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution since it attempts to apply different rates of taxation to prop-
erty of the same class, and that the distinction upon which the legis-
lature bases its power to impose a different rate of taxation is arbitrary
and discriminatory. He contends also, that the State cannot, upon
mere difference of location, justify a difference in rates regarding prop-
erty In the same class. The entire issue resolves itself to this: Is the
classification made by the Kentucky statute,2 between deposits in Ken-
tucky banks and deposits in other banks located outside the State, a
reasonable classification? If it is a reasonable classification, is the dif-
ference in rate between local and foreign banks arbitrary and dis-
criminatory?
Application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Section 171 of the Kentucky Constitution definitely
indicates that a State cannot apply different rates of taxation to prop-
erty having the same classification. The state may classify different
kinds of property into different classes and impose different rates of
taxation upon the different classes, but the difference must rest upon
some genuine distinction and not upon one of time or place.
In Louisvi~e Gas Co. v. Coleman,3 the Kentucky Mortgage Tax Act
was held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution because the statute could not impose a tax on the record-
ing of mortgages having a maturity of more than five years and no
tax on the recording of mortgages having an earlier maturity, and still
be considered fair and non-discriminatory.
1265 Ky. 684, 97 S. W. (2d) 561 (1936).
2 Ky. Stat., Sec. 4019a-1.
3 277 U. S. 32, 72 L. Ed. 770, 48 Sup. Ct. 423 (1928).
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In State v. HoytP the court held invalid a state statute the effect
of which was to impose a tax upon the sales of goods manufactured
within the state, while leaving the sales of goods manufactured with-
out the state free from taxation. The court ruled that the classifica-
tion could not be based upon any difference in the goods, because there
was none; nor on the fact that they were made in different states,
for that bore no proper and just relation to the classification but was
purely arbitrary; nor on the difference of residence of the manufacturers
for the same reason.
In Colgate v. Harvey,5 a Vermont statute was held to have violated
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by vir-
tue of the fact that it attempted to tax the interest from loans made
outside the state and exempted interest earned from loans made within
the state. The courts in other decisions have indicated that the judi-
ciary is reluctant to accept mere differences having no reasonable and
fair substantial relation to the subject matter with regard to which
such classification is proposed.
The court in P. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia7 stated:-
"The classification in order to avoid the constitutional prohi-
bition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences, as dis-
tinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. The test to be
applied is-does the statute arbitrarily and without genuine
reason impose a burden upon one group of taxpayers from which
it exempts another group of taxpayers, both of them occupying
substantially the same relation toward the subject matter of
legislation. Mere difference is not enough."
In the case of Uhalker v. Birmingham & Northwestern Ry. Co., the
court held a Tennessee statute which taxed construction companies on
the basis of the location of their chief office invalid on the ground that
the basis of the difference in the tax rate was arbitrary and discrimina-
tory. The court stated:
"We can find no adequate basis for taxing individuals accord-
ing to the location of their chief offices, the classification we
think is arbitrary and unreasonable. Under the United States
Constitution a citizen of one state is guaranteed the right to enjoy
in all states equality of commercial privileges with their citizens,
but he cannot have his chief office in every one of them."
The same reasoning may be applied to the instant case.
In State Tax Uomn. et al. v. Shattuck et al.,$ the Intangible Prop-
471 Vt. 59, 42 Atl. 973 (1899).
S296 U. S. 404, 80 L. Ed. 299, 56 Sup. Ct. 252 (1935).6 Gulf, Colorado & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. Ed.
666, 17 Sup. Ct. 255 (1897); in re Harkness' Estate, 83 Okla. 107, 204
Pac. 911 (1922); F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412,
64 L. Ed. 989, 40 Sup. Ct. 560 (1920).
7 ,9"ra, n. 6.
8249 U. S. 522, 63 L. Ed. 748, 39 Sup. Ct. 366 (1919).
*-Ariz.-, 38 P. (2d) 631 (1934).
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erty Tax Act, which was passed by the legislature in the state of Ari-
zona In 1933, which exempted domestic insurance companies and com-
panies who paid taxes on premiums from paying the intangible prop-
erty tax, but provided for all other insurance companies to pay such
tax, was held to be in violation of the Arizona Constitution which
provides as follows: "All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class
of property. 10
The court, in McPherson v. Fisher," made a similar decision. The
plaintiff in this case challenged the constitutionality of an Oregon
statute which imposed a tax upon her income from intangibles without
exemption because her husband had an income in excess of $2,500, and
granted an exemption to unmarried women with the same income.
The statute was held to be in contravention of Art. I, Section 32, of
the Oregon Constitution.
The statute as applied in the Colgate v. Harvey case in effect states
that if a citizen resident in Vermont loans money at five percent
Interest or less in other states he must pay a tax upon the income from
such loans, but if he makes the loans within the state of Vermont at
the same rate, no tax whatever shall be imposed. It reasonably is not
open to doubt that the discriminatory tax here imposed abridges the
privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States to loan
money and to make contracts with respect thereto in any part of the
country. The dissenting opinion of this case stated:
"Exemption of income from investments in property within
the State and taxation of like income from without the State are
thought to be valid, but the privileges and immunities clause of
the Federal Constitution, it is declared, forbids any difference in
taxation of income from investments made without the State.
A conclusion which can only be attributed to the belief that this
discrimination as distinguished from others is arbitrary and
unreasonable."
As a final consideration, it does not seem to be a satisfactory
solution to the problem to simply say that the Kentucky Statutes, Sec-
tion 4019a-1, is valid and reasonable, in distinguishing between bank
deposits in Kentucky banks and deposits in other banks located with-
out the State, without reconciling the aforementioned cases. To say
that the classification is for the purpose of keeping deposits in local
banks so as to benefit local business, a purely legislative motive, is to
admit that the statute is arbitrary. Therefore, the classification of
bank deposits as local and foreign would be based upon a "mere dif-
ference" insufficient to justify a difference in the rate of taxation of
property within the same class. Assuming that the classification is
reasonable, the rate of taxation based on the difference in location is
arbitrary and unreasonably discriminatory, since it deprives one of
the constitutional guarantees that inure to him as a citizen of the
United States. Louis H. LEvrT.
1 0Art. 9, See. 1.
1143 Ore. 615, 23 P. (2d) 913 (1933).
Supra, n. 5.
